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The International Art Auction Industry:
Has Competition Tarnished its Finish?

Brenna Adler*
The modem auction industry is a lucrative business enterprise in both
the United States' and in Europe. 2 The traditional function of the auction
house as a "mere intermediary" between seller and buyer has eroded and
been replaced by a more complex set of practices.' Over the past thirty
years, auction houses have changed from being wholesale suppliers for art
dealers, to direct marketers of art to the general public.4 In the process, the
large international auction houses, Sotheby's, Christie's and others, have
competed fiercely to auction the most expensive and alluring art.5 These
auction houses have created a modern "international art market," wherein
they, in effect, "[engage] in worldwide competition" to obtain and auction
off the most desirable consignments. 6 The consignments are works of artincluding paintings, jewelry and furniture-that the auction houses receive
from private collectors or art dealers. 7 In order to compete with each other,
. J.D. candidate, May 2003, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A. 1997,
University of California at Berkeley. I would like to thank my family and friends for their comments, support, and encouragement.
1Stuart Bennett, Fine Art Auctions and the Law: A Reassessment in the Aftermath of
Cristallina, 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 257, 258 (1992).
2 Van Kirk Reeves & Jan M. Boll, General Report, Auction Sales and Conditions, 3
INTERNATIONAL ART TRADE AND LAW 354 (Martine Briat & Judith A. Freedberg eds.,
1991); see also Shelby White, Putting Your Possessions on the Block, N.Y. TIMES, June 14,
1987, § 3, at 11.
3 Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 355; see generally id. at 353-354; see also Jorge
Contreras, The Art Auctioneer: Duties and Assumptions, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
717, 720 (1991).
4 Contreras, supra note 3, at 719.

5 Douglas C. McGill, Sweeping Reassessment in the Auction Trade, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
1985, at A1; Bennett, supra note 1, at 257-58.
6Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 353-54.
' Jennifer Dixon, Prosecutors Say Chairs at Sotheby's, Christie's Devised Price-Fixing
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international auction houses are offering controversial financial services 8
and conducting other practices, 9 that may result in conflicts of interest between the auction house, the sellers, the buyers, and the public.' °
The foundation of the auctioneer's duty is agency law." However, it
extends beyond that.12 Duties of auctioneers have broadened to the buyer
as well as the public. 13 The laws that regulate auctioneers vary between
countries.14 However, the controversial practices by the auction houses that
will be discussed below seem to evade regulation, particularly in America
and Britain.' 5 The "fierce competition" between the large international auction houses appears to drive them to commit illegal behavior, breaking both
civil and criminal laws, while they violate their duties to sellers, buyers and
the public. 16 Indeed, the competition has ultimately culminated in one of
the worst scandals the art auction world has seen: a collusive price-fixing
scheme between the two largest auction houses in the United States and
Britain, Sotheby's and Christie's.17
The question, then, is how and why do the international auction houses
continue to thrive in the midst of unconscionable actions on their part? And
ultimately, what can be done to curb the illegal behavior of the auction industry while emphasizing an appreciation for the uniqueness of the goodsart-they trade? The lack of cohesive international laws to regulate the
auction industry is some evidence of the desire by the international community to leave auction houses to their own devices.' 8 I argue that a stronger,
Scheme, KRTBN
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MICHIGAN, Nov. 10, 2001, available at 2001 WL 29846337.
8 Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 354; see also Contreras, supra note 3, at 741-42.
9 Contreras, supra note 3, at 719; see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 257-58.
10Bennett, supra note 1, at 262; Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 355-56; Contreras, supra
note 3, at 719.
11Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods Int'l, Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 171 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986); see Bennett, supra note 1, at 262-66; Martine Briat & Judith A. Freedberg,
Introduction to Auction Sales and Conditions, 3 INTERNATIONAL ART TRADE AND LAW 349
(Martine Briat & Judith A. Freedberg eds., 1991) [hereinafter Introduction];P.J. O'Keefe &
Lyndel V. Prott, LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE MOVEMENT 315 (Butterworths, London

and Edinburgh 1989).
12Contreras, supra note 3, at 719; see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 269.
13Contreras, supra note 3, at 720, 730; Bennett, supra note 1, at 269.
14See generally O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 335-360 (discussing auctioneering
laws of different countries).
15See Contreras, supra note 3, at 730, (asserting that agency law is not adequate for governing the practices of auctioneers in America); see generally Bennett, supra note 1, at 262283 (discussing controversial practices by auction houses).
16McGill, supra note 5, at C20; see Bennett, supra note 1, at 258.
'7 Ralph Blumenthal & Carol Vogel, Ex-Chiefof Sotheby's Is Convicted
of Price Fixing,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at Al.
'8 See John P. Shinn, A New World Orderfor CulturalProperty: Addressing the Failure
of Internationaland Domestic Regulation of the InternationalArt Market, 34 SANTA CLARA
L REV. 977, 993 (1994), (discussing how the international treaty, UNESCO, fails to regulate
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more cohesive international regulation specially tailored to the auction industry is required in order to keep auction houses from committing unlawful behavior. Auction houses should not be considered merely businesses.
Rather, special regulations are needed-regulations that take into account
the unique goods that auction houses sell.
Part I of this comment will describe auctioneers' duties to sellers under
the law. I will compare and contrast the laws of the United States, the
Netherlands, and France and focus on an American case that discusses the
breach of an auctioneer's duty to the seller. Part II will discuss the controversial practices performed and services provided, allegedly under the auctioneer's duty of agency to the seller, in the United States and abroad. I will
discuss how competition between the major auction houses may drive these
practices to extremes. Part III will discuss the auctioneer's duty to the
buyer. Again, I will compare the laws of different countries, including the
United States, France, and the Netherlands. Part IV will analyze the New
York City regulations as an example of the difficult nature of reconciling
the auctioneer's duty to the seller, the buyer and the public while attempting
to address the current controversial practices of the auction industry. Part V
will discuss the most recent illegal practices performed by the large international auction houses, Christie's and Sotheby's. Part VI will argue that the
international community's failure to regulate the sale of stolen art by private
institutions, including auction houses, is evidence of the community's lack
of ability or desire to generally regulate the auction industry. Part VII will
discuss the uniqueness of the art auction industry, from the extraordinary
works of art it sells, to the glamour and prestige embedded in the industry.
Finally, Part VIII will argue for special regulations that recognize and respect the uniqueness of the goods that the auction industry deals in, and attempt to curb the wrongful and illegal behavior of the auction houses.
I. AUCTIONEER'S DUTY TO THE SELLER: THE LAW OF AGENCY
A. Fiduciary Duty
The auctioneer's legal duty is based on the law of agency. 19 An
American court ruled that as the agent to the consignor, the auctioneer has a
fiduciary duty "to act in the utmost good faith and in the interest of' the
consignor.2 0 An auctioneer is responsible for using reasonable efforts to disclose material facts to the consignor. 2' The auctioneer's ultimate duty is
the sale of stolen art in private institutions).
19Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 171; see Introduction, supra note 11, at 350; see O'Keefe
& Prott, supra note 11, at 315.
20 Id. at 171; see Bennett, supra note I (discussing extensively Cristallina
and the effect
the decision has had on the auction world).
1 21 Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 171; Contreras, supra note 3, at 726; Bennett, supra note
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to obtain the best price for the consignor.22 When an auctioneer fails to perform these practices, the auctioneer has breached his fiduciary duty.23
Auctioneering practices in the United States, however, can be contrasted with the practices of other countries. 24 In New York, the auctioneer
is required to have a license, and is wholly responsible for maintaining
proper conduct throughout the auction. 25 By contrast, in the Netherlands,
the state provides a type of intermediary between the auctioneer and the
seller and the public, 2giving the state a tighter stronghold on the auctioneering practice. In order to have a legal auction, the auctioneer must be supervised by a state-appointed civil law notary or bailiff.27 The bailiff or
notary is responsible for ensuring that the "rules of conduct" of the auction
are "properly followed., 28 In essence, the bailiff or notary is considered the
"custodian of good conduct" and, as such, is responsible for monitoring
whether the auctioneer is abiding by "general standards of honesty and decency. '29 This includes assuring that improper practices, such as "fake bidding" or the "sale of stolen goods," do not occur.3 0 Notwithstanding the
requirement of a state-appointed custodian, however, the Dutch auctioneer
is still fully responsible for "proper compliance with the conditions of

1, at 265.
22 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 315; Bennett, supra note 1, at 264-65.
23 Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
24 See supra note 14, and accompanying text; see Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 353-55.
256 Rules of the City of New York § 2-122 (2001).
26

Jan M. Boll, The Netherlands, Auction Sales and Conditions, 3

INTERNATIONAL ART

TRADE AND LAW 389, (Martine Briat & Judith A. Freedberg eds.,
AMBTELIJK TOEZICHT BIJ OPENBARE VERKOPINGEN OF 15 DEC. 1971, § 748
ficial Supervision at Public Auctions] and DUTCH CIVIL CODE art. 1255).

1991) (citing

WET

[The Act on the OfPlease note that the"
Dutch Civil Code has been undergoing extensive revision since 1992; some sections are not
yet 27
complete. The revisions may or may not have an effect on the notary/bailiff requirement.
1d. (citing WET AMBTELIJK TOEZICHT BIU OPENBARE VERKOPINGEN OF 15 DEC. 1971, §
748 [The Act on the Official Supervision at Public Auctions]). The Dutch law on public
sales has been modified as of January 1, 2002. Wet Ambtelijk Toezicht Bij Openbare Verkopingen (Versie Geldig Vanaf: 01-01-2002), at http://wettenbank.sdu.nl/cgi-bin/
showlawtext/vkey=W05801BI/pos=6/session=anonymous.
However, the law requiring a
state-appointed notary or bailiff still applies to public auctions. Article 1 of the modified Act
states, "Het is verboden openbare verkopingen bij opbod, bij opbod en afslag of bij afslag
van roerende zaken, met uitzondering van zaken, toebehorende aan of beheerd door de Staat,
provincies, gemeenten ... of andere lichamen aan wie krachtens de Grondwet verordenende
bevoegdheid is verleend, te houden, anders dan ten overstaan van notarissen of van deurwaarders bij de rechterlijke colleges." Id. The translation states, "It is prohibited to hold
public sales of movable property, except of property belonging to or administered by the nation, provinces, cities ... or other administrative bodies empowered by the Constitution to
rule, without the presence of a notary public or a bailiff." (Patrick Geeraert, LLM, Northwestern University School of Law, trans.).
28 Boll, supra note 26, at 390.
29 id.
30
1d.
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sale.",31 Similar to the fiduciary duty of the New York auctioneer to the
consignor,3 2 in the Netherlands, under the conditions
of sale, the auctioneer
33
has a duty to act in good faith and fairness.
In France, the auctioneer has traditionally been a State official.34
These State officials or agents are named "commissariespriseurs.'3 5 For
centuries, state-appointed auctioneers in France have held a monopoly over
the auction industry in France. 36 Because the auctioneer in France has always been appointed by the state, the auctioneer has different duties than
auctioneers in other countries.37 The French auctioneer is a "member of an
organized, regulated corporation," and38 is under the supervision of the corporation as well as the French courts.
Thus, more similar to the Netherlands, and in contrast to the United
States (the New York rule), the French auctioneering system has traditionally been tightly controlled by the state. However, in July 2001, a law was
passed in France that broke up the monopoly of the commissariespriseurs
over the auction industry. 39 This new development will eventually allow international auction houses such as Christie's and Sotheby's to do business
in France because the state agents, or commissariespriseurs,though still
prevalent in the French auction industry, will no longer be required to run a
public art auction in France.40
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty?
Under the umbrella of maintaining a fiduciary duty to the consignor,
auction houses in New York and abroad, including London and Geneva,
have consistently maintained the practice of keeping reserve prices a secret. 41 A reserve price is a price below which an auctioneer cannot sell the
item at auction.42 A reserve price is one that must be agreed upon by the
seller and auctioneer.43 It has been asserted that keeping the reserve price a
31Id.at
32 See

391.

Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
33Boll, supra note 26, at 392. However, the Netherlands appears to construe the auctioneer's duty a bit more broadly and in more vague language, by stating that the auctioneer has
the same duty of "diligence ... as is required in society in respect of the legitimate interests
of other people." Id
34O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 341.
35PrisedOpen; French Auctioneers, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 1, 2001, at 53.
36 Id; see also O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 341.
37See O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 341, 344.
38
d.at 341.
39PrisedOpen, supra note 35, at 53.

40 id
41See White, supra note 2; see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 283; see also Contreras, su-

pra note 3, at 743-44.
42 Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 168 n.2.
43id.
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secret creates an exciting atmosphere for both the seller and buyer; the
buyer is unaware of the lowest price for which the seller is willing to settle,
and the seller may be pleasantly surprised by bids that far exceed his reserve. 44 The auction industry asserts that secret reserve prices protect the
seller by preserving that "little bit of mystery. 4 5 In addition, the seller
benefits because secret reserve prices guarantee a minimum price to the
seller 46 -without reserve prices, a seller would have no right to reclaim his
work if it did not sell at a price that was acceptable to him.47 Also, if a
seller were not allowed to obtain a reserve price, he would most likely take
his work to a private dealer where he could directly negotiate the price of
his work. 48 Secret reserves serve to maintain competition between American and European auction houses. 49 New York auction houses assert that if
secret reserve prices were abolished in New York, sellers would take their
consignments to other major auction cities in Europe, such as London and
Geneva.5° When an auctioneer abuses the secret reserve system, however,
an American court has ruled that a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty exists .
In a New York case, a court held that a consignor had a valid cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty against an auctioneer at Christie's when,
inter alia, the auctioneer recommended a reserve price to the consignor that
52
was above the value of the "high estimates" already quoted to the public.
In Cristallinav. Christie's,the former president of Christie's auction house,
David Bathurst, agreed to consign for sale eight Impressionist paintings
owned by Cristallina, a Panamanian art investment company. Cristallina
representative, Dimitry Jodido, chose Christie's to auction his paintings because Bathurst suggested auction estimates totaling $12.6 million for the
eight paintings 4 What Bathurst did not tell Jodido was that Christopher
44See Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 358.
45McGill, supra note 5, at C20; see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 283.
46 McGill, supra note 5, at C20.
47Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 358; see also Contreras, supra note 3, at 743.
48Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 358.
49See McGill, supra note 5, at C20.

50White, supra note 2; see also Contreras, supra note 3, at 745; see also McGill, supra
note 5, at C20.
51See Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d, at 171-72; see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 264.
52Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d, at 171 (the Appellate Court modified and denied the previous summary judgment ruling, allowing causes of action for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary
duty and fraudulent misrepresentation); see also Bennett, supra note 1 (discussing at length
Cristallinaand its effect on the auction industry, particularly in New York).
53Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d, at 167; see also Donald Wintersgill, Christie's Settle Out of
Court over Alleged New York Sale Fraud,THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Jan. 23, 1987.

54Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d, at 167. The court asserts, that, according to Jodido, while
Bathurst did suggest the paintings may sell at a lower amount, Bathurst "played down" the
lower auction estimate amounts and "focus[ed]" on the $12.6 million figure.
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Burge, the head of Christie's Impressionist painting department, believed
the paintings would not come close to obtaining the $12.6 million Bathurst
had quoted Jodido. 55 On May 4, 1981, weeks prior to the auction,
Christie's published "pre-sale estimates" for seven of the eight paintings;
the total of the "high estimates" for the seven paintings was $8.55 millionover $4 million lower than the figure quoted to Jodido. 56 Then, on May 12,
1981, Christie's public relations representative informed a major television
station that Christie's expected to receive between $5 million and $9 million for the paintings. 57 However, the day before the auction, Bathurst recommended to Jodido a reserve price of $9.25 million without informing
Jodido that Christie's published "high estimate"($8.55 million) was below
the recommended reserve, nor that Christie's had publicly announced (on
May 12) that the paintings would sell for, at most, $9 million. 58 By the time
the auction was over, only one of Jodido's paintings had sold. 59 Because
there were no bids that met the set reserve prices of the other seven paintings, Bathurst "bought in" the seven paintings; that is, at the auction,
Bathurst slammed the hammer down at prices for the seven paintings that
were under the reserve prices, and thus, were returned unsold to Jodido.6 °
The "buy in" practice is in fact quite common among auction houses. 6'
However, what was unusual in the Cristallinacase was that Bathurst then
advised Christie's press department to put out a press release stating that
three, instead of one, of the paintings had been sold at auction.62
The Cristallinacourt, overturning summary judgment for Christie's
and Bathurst, determined that Cristallina stated legitimate causes of action
against Christie's for, inter alia,breaching its fiduciary duty and misrepresenting material facts to Jodido.63 The court, clearly dismayed by
Bathurst's behavior, asserted that, as Cristallina's agent, Bathurst had a fiduciary duty to "act in the utmost good faith and in the interest of Cristallina. ' '64 According to the court, Bathurst appeared to have breached this
'5Id.at
56 Id.

168.
at 168-69; see O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 343 (asserting that auction houses

publish "pre-sale estimates" which are low and high prices of a work that are based on "historical records of sale prices similar or comparative works of art") (quoting J.A. Och,
Sotheby's-Anatomy of an Auction House, INTERNATIONAL SALES OF WORKS OF ART 251

(1988)).
57Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d, at 169.
58 Id. at 169-70.
59
/d. at 170.
60Bennett, supra note 1, at 261; see also Contreras, supra note 3, at 743, for a description
of "bought in."
61 Contreras, supra note 3, at 743; see O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 357-58 ("[The
buy in process] give[s] the appearance of a sale when in truth none has been made.").
62 Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d, at 170; see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 261.

63Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d, at 171-72.
64Id.at 171.

439

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

23:433 (2003)

duty in several ways. 65 First, the court asserted that agents have a duty to
use reasonable efforts to convey material information to their principals.6 6
The court asserted that Christie's may indeed have violated this duty by
withholding material information when Bathurst failed to inform Jodido of
Burge's disagreement over the paintings' value at auction and when
Bathurst failed to inform Jodido of the price estimates released to the media
and public in May 1981.67 In addition, the court, seemingly amazed at
Bathurst's behavior, lamented that Bathurst violated Christie's own policy
of not allowing reserve prices to exceed the high estimates, and that he
knew or should have known that it would be "virtually impossible" to sell
the paintings as a result of the contradictory behavior of setting the reserve
prices above the high estimates.68
Next, the court determined that an agent has an "implied good faith obligation [to] use his best efforts to promote the principal's product"; that is,
principals impliedly rely on their agent's "judgment and integrity" when the
agent is carrying out the determined task.69 In auction situations in particular, the court asserted that, while auctioneers are not expected to predict the
price that a painting will bring, the auctioneer is still "held to a standard of
care commensurate with the special skill which is the norm in the locality
for that kind of work.",70 Here, the court determined that a question of fact
did exist as to whether Christie's and Bathurst breached this duty by
71 not
expertise."
and
skill
their
with
commensurate
manner
a
acting "in
Next, the court agreed that a question of fact existed as to whether
Bathurst was guilty of fraudulently misrepresenting to Jodido the prices that
the paintings could obtain at auction. 72 The court determined that even if
the estimated values asserted by Bathurst were considered73mere "opinions,"
Bathurst still had an obligation to give a truthful opinion.
In the end, Christie's settled the case. 74 And, as a result of the press release that falsely announced the sale of three paintings, Christie's was fined
$80,000 and both Bathurst's and Burge's licenses were suspended. 75 Ultimately, Bathurst lost his job.76

65 id.
66 d. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 381).

67

1Id. at 171-72.
68 Cristallina, 502

N.Y.S.2d, at 172.

69 id.

70 id.

71 id.
72 id.

73 Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d, at 172.
74 Bennett, supra note 1, at 263.
75 Bennett, supra note 1, at 264; see also McGill, supra note 5.
76Bennett, supra note 1, at 264.
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II. CONTROVERSIAL PRACTICES IN THE AUCTION INDUSTRY: IN THE NAME
OF THE AUCTIONEER'S DUTY TO THE SELLER

Author Stuart Bennett asserts that the Cristallina court implicitly assumed Bathurst was driven by the competition between Christie's and
Sotheby's and therefore was determined to get the Cristallina consignment,
regardless of whether he had to lie and manipulate to get it. 77 Issues that
arose from the practices of Bathurst at Christie's, as well as other questionable practices (that did not arise in Cristallina) performed in the name of the
auctioneer's duty of agency to the consignor, do indeed give rise to a question of unhealthy competition within the international auction industry.7 8
A. Another Take on Secret Reserves
Controversy surrounds the secret reserve system practiced in America
and other countries, even when auctioneers do not abuse the system by
placing the reserve price above the high estimate. 79 As described above, the
auction industry in New York, as well as other major auction centers, including London and Geneva, strongly supports a secret reserve system.8 °
However, opponents argue that reserves should be made public. 8' The controversial aspect of secret reserves occurs when the auctioneer "bids off the
chandelier., 82 This means that the auctioneer "rapidly announc[es] bids in
the early bidding, even though no one in the audience is actually bidding on
the object. '83 The auction houses assert that the secrecy of the process is
necessary.8 4 When a work has been placed up on the block, the auctioneer
will begin "bidding off the chandelier" or "off the wall" 85 - that is, the auctioneer will pretend to take a party - in order to encourage the audience to
start bidding and "push the price over the secret reserve price., 86 It is argued that this practice is deceptive to buyers because they believe they are
competing with other potential buyers,8 7 which can ultimately result in the

77

Id. at 262.

78 McGill, supra note 5, at C20; see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 262.
79 See Contreras, supra note 3, at 743; see also O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 357;

see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 283; see also McGill, supra note 5, at C20.
80 See White, supra note 2; see also supra text at Part I.B.
81Contreras, supra note 3, at 743; see also McGill, supra note 5, at C20; see Bennett, supra note 1,at 283.
82 McGill, supra note 5, at C20; Contreras, supra note 3, at 745; see Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 358.
83 McGill, supra note 5, at C20.
84 Contreras, supra note 3, at 744; McGill, supra note 5, at C20; see supra
Part 1.B.
85 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11,
at 357.
86 McGill, supra note 5, at C20; see also O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 357.
87 Contreras, supra note 3, at 745; McGill, supra note 5, at C20; see also Reeves & Boll,
supra note 2, at 258.
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creation of "false high prices.""8
Another aspect of secret reserves that is considered controversial is the
offshoot of secret reserves, "buying in." 89 This is the process, described
above, that occurs if the reserve price of a work has not been reached, but
the auctioneer slams the gavel down anyway "to a sham bid." 90 The auction
audience is therefore left unaware of what was really sold. 91
It has been asserted that there are valid reasons to perform the "buy in"
process.9 2 When a work cannot sell-that is, nobody in the audience has
bid at least as high as the reserve price-the reputation of the work can be
tarnished. 93 More significant, however, is the fact that the auction houses
are concerned for their own reputation when the work does not sell. 94
However, despite the argument for maintaining healthy competition between international auction houses and maintaining the "reputation" of the
individual auction house, the secret reserve practice leaves open gaps in
which auction houses can perpetrate deception upon the public.95 This
clearly occurred in the Cristallinacase. 96 Because of the secret reserve and
"buy in" system, Bathurst was ultimately able to deceive his consignor
(Jodido) and the public, by placing the secret reserve above the high estimate as well as putting out a false press release. 97 Ironically, Bathurst's explanation for putting out the false press release was that it was for "the
benefit of [Cristallina] and the art market." 98 It seems clear that what
Bathurst was doing was going to an extreme to protect the reputation of
both Cristallina and Christie's. Ultimately, it appears that Christie's competition with Sotheby's drove Bathurst to manipulate the already controversial secret reserve and "buy in" systems, eventually99breaching his duty to
his consignor and perpetuating fraud on the public.

88McGill, supra note 5, at C20.

89See Bennett, supra note 1, at 282; see also O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 357-59.
90 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 358.
9' Id. at 358, 362.
92Id. at 357.
93 Id.; see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 259.
94 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 357-58.
95 See Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 358; see also McGill, supra note 5, at C20; Contreras, supra note 3, at 745; and Bennett, supra note 1,at 264, 283.
96 Bennett, supra note 1,at 264; O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 358.
97 See Bennett, supra note 1, at 263-64; see O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 358.
98Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
99 See Bennett, supra note 1, at 262 (suggesting that Christie's self-interest prevailed
when dealing with Cristallina because Christie's was absolutely determined to obtain the
Cristallina consignment in order to "gain a competitive edge over Sotheby's in the New
York market.").
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B. "Guarantees"
Another practice that is considered controversial is the practice of auction houses "guaranteeing" minimum prices to consignors-regardless of
whether or not the work sells.100 Thus, even if no bidders bid up to the reserve price, the consignor is guaranteed a minimum price from the auction
house itself. 0 1 This practice was initially begun when Sotheby's and
Christie's agreed to offer guaranteed minimum prices to "exceptional" consignments. 0 2 However, other smaller auction houses have also begun to offer guarantees.'0 3 The controversy lies in the fact that, by providing a
guarantee to a consignor, the auction house literally has an interest in the
good.'0 4 "[The auction house] is, in effect, auctioning its own property."' 10 5
The practice of guaranteeing presents a conflict of interest-with both the
buyer and seller. 0 6 The provision of high guarantees may cause the auctioneer to over-publicize and overestimate the cost of the work, ultimately
distorting prices. 0 7 Indeed, some auction houses have taken the guarantee
practice to an extreme.' 08 Phillips auction house in London, owned by
French businessman Bernard Arnault, has been aggressive in its attempt to
win business by offering extraordinarily high guarantees to coveted consignments.109 Thus, guarantees are another avenue of competition for the
auction houses that is susceptible to exploitation but is not (yet) considered
illegal.'' 0
III. THE AUCTIONEER'S DUTY TO THE BUYER

It has been established that the auctioneer is the agent of the
seller/consignor. The next question, then, is what duties, if any, does the
auctioneer owe to the buyer?"' In the United States, a conflict of interest
arises after the auctioneer's hammer falls, and he has a "double agency"
duty to both seller and buyer.1 2 While it is asserted that the auctioneer's

100 Contreras, supra note 3, at 747; Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 359; Affairs of the
Art, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 1, 2001, at 53.
101 Affairs of the Art, supra note 100, at 53.
102 Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 359.
103 See Affairs of the Art, supra note 100, at 53.
104 Id.;
see Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 359.

os Affairs of the Art, supra note 100, at 53.
Id.; Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 359; Contreras, supra note 3, at 747-48.
107 Contreras, supra note 3, at 748; Affairs of the Art, supra note 100, at 53.
08 Affairs of the Art, supra note 100, at 53.
109 Indeed, the practice seems to be working, as Phillip's landed the "most coveted [auc106

tion] consignments" in 2001. Id.
1"0
See id; Contreras, supra note 3, at 747-48.
1 Bennett, supra note 1, at 269; Contreras, supra note 3, at 731-32; Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 359-60.
12Contreras, supra note 3, at 732; see also Bennett, supra note 1,at 269.
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duty to the buyer is subordinated to that of the seller,' 13 auction houses in
the United States and abroad have dealt with the question of what exactly
the auction house owes the buyer. 114 Countries vary in their laws regarding
auction house liability to buyers." 15 In the 1978 New York case, Dawson v.
Malina, the question of applying express warranties against fine art dealers
by art buyers came to a head. In Dawson, the plaintiff, an art collector,
bought several Chinese art pieces from defendant, a private art dealer, who
claimed the pieces originated from a particular dynasty (i.e., from a particular period of Chinese antiquity)." 6 The plaintiff brought suit for breach of
warranty when he came to believe the objects had been misattributed by the
defendant-that in fact, the pieces were not from the specific periods of
Chinese antiquity that the defendant had represented them to be--but instead were forgeries.' 17 Plaintiff brought suit under a New York express
warranty of authenticity statute that read:
Whenever an art merchant, in selling or exchanging a work of fine art, furnishes to a buyer of such work who is not an art merchant, a written instrument
which, in describing the work, identifies it with any author or authorship, such
description (i) shall be presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain; and (ii)
shall create an express warranty8 of the authenticity of such authorship as of the
date of such sale or exchange.'

Contreras, supra note 3, at 731-32; Bennett, supra note 1, at 269.
See Bennett, supra note 1, at 269-70; Contreras, supra note 3, at 731-32; Reeves &
Boll, supra note 2, at 350, 359-61.
115See Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 350, 357.
116 Dawson v. Malina, 463 F. Supp. 461, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
117 id.
11 Id. at 465-66 (citing N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 219-c (repealed 1984)). This statute has
113
114

been replaced by N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.01 (McKinney 1984 and Supp. 1992).
However, I cite the old version of the statute because it is the one the Dawson court uses in
its analysis. The old and new statutes are extremely similar in content-and thus, the replacement of the old statute with the new one appears to be a mere technicality. N.Y. ARTS &
CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.01 reads in part:
1.Whenever an art merchant, in selling or exchanging a work of fine art, furnishes to a buyer of such
work who is not an art merchant, a certificate of authenticity or any similar written instrument:
(a) Shall be presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain; and
(b) Shall create an express warranty for the material facts stated as of the date of such sale
or exchange.
In addition, N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 11.01 supplies the definitions of the various
terminology contained in § 13.01. See also Bennett, supra note 1, at 280 (discussing the instatement of § 13.01).
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The Dawson court analyzed the New York express warranty provision' 1 9
for the first time. 120 Because the descriptions of the art objects made by the
defendant to the plaintiff specifically attributed the objects to a particular
dynasty (i.e., authorship) the representations did constitute express warranties under the statute. 21 Acknowledging that attributing any work of art to
a particular dynasty is an "inexact science," the standard the court applied
in determining whether the defendant had breached the warranty was
"whether the representations furnished [plaintiff] by [defendant]

. ..

had a

reasonable basis in fact, at the time that [the] representationswere made..
,122 The court determined that a "reasonable basis in fact" should be measured by expert testimony provided at trial. 23 The court, in weighing the
expert testimony at trial, determined that plaintiff was entitled to receive a
refund on three of the five objects in dispute because, at the time the defendant made the representations about the three objects to the plaintiff, he
the sufficient knowllacked a reasonable basis in fact-that is, he lacked 124
representations.
such
make
to
information
edge and
At the time, the Dawson reasoning could only implicitly be applied to
auctioneers, as the case focuses explicitly on the duty of art dealers to their
buyers. However, several years after Dawson, New York explicitly included "auctioneer" in the express warranty statute's definition of "art merchant"; 125 thus, auctioneers are clearly bound by the express warranty
statute the same way that private art dealers are. In a more recent American
case, Pritzker v. Krishna Gallery ofAsian Arts,' 26 the court applied the New
York express warranty statute,12' and slightly modified the standard in
Dawson. Including a Hawaiian court decision, Balog v. Center Art GalleryHawaii,Inc., in its analysis, Pritzkerreasoned that a court, in applying a
"reasonable basis in fact," should not solely rely on expert testimony because "[e]xpert testimony ...does not necessarily address what was known
or should have been known to the defendant at the time he made the
sale." 28 A court may determine what was known or should have been
119 At the time of the case, the express warranty provision referred to was §219-c of the
N.Y. General Business Law. The statute has since been replaced by N.Y. ARTS AND CULT.
AFF.20LAW §13.01.
1 Dawson,463 F. Supp. at 467.
121Id.at 466. Under N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 11.01(3), "authorship" includes the
"period, culture, source or origin.., with which the creation of such work is identified in the
description of the work."
122 Dawson,463 F. Supp. at 467 (emphasis added).
123 Idr.
124Id.at 468-72.

1, at n. 105.
Pritzker v. Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8778, at *52-53
1995).
(N.D. I11.
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 11.01(2); see Bennett, supra note
125
126

127 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.01.

121Pritzker. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8778, at *52-53 (emphasis added).
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known to the defendant at the time of the sale by seeing whether defendant
"undert[ook] a 'sufficient investigation' to substantiate the authenticity of
the art objects in question.' 2 9 The Pritzker court, integrating the Balog
court standard, seems to up the ante for the art merchant (which includes
auctioneers) by holding, in part, the art merchantpersonally responsible for
ensuring the authenticity of the art pieces he sells.
Similar to the New York statute and the Dawson and Pritzkercourts'
reasoning, Sotheby's and Christie's (in Great Britain and the United States)
also offer limited warranties to buyers, which are published in their catalogues.' 30 Sotheby's "guarantee of authenticity of Authorship" in part
reads,
[I]f within ...
5 years from the date of the sale of any lot, the original purchaser of record tenders to us a purchased lot ...and it is established that the
identification of Authorship ...of such lot ...is not substantially correct

based on a fair reading of the catalogue including the terms of any Glossary
contained herein, the sale of such lot will be rescinded and the original purchase price refunded.'31
In France, however, the state-appointed auctioneer has very little liability to
either the buyer or the seller.' 32 When a buyer in France attempts to show
that an item he bought at auction is not what it was represented to be in the
catalogue, the buyer must prove the misattribution by an "objective" standard.133 This appears to be an extremely difficult task because French society pays extreme deference to the prestigious, specialized position of
auctioneers.134 In other words, in France, it is difficult for a buyer to prove
an auctioneer has made a mistake.' 35 In addition, when a buyer has a claim,
in most instances, the buyer does not have a right against the auctioneer, but
rather against the seller/consignor.1 36 The auctioneer's official status as a
37
state agent deters the French courts from finding any liability on his part.'
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Civil Code provides extensive consumer

129Id. at *53, *54 (quoting Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, 745 F. Supp. 1556, 1556
(D. Haw. 1990)); see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 278-79 (giving a more detailed analysis
of the Balog decision).
130Bennett, supra note 1,at 276-77, 281; O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 345;
Contreras, supra note 3, at 735.

131 Bennett, supra note 1, at 276 (citing 19TH CENTURY EUROPEAN PAINTINGS,
DRAWINGS
AND SCULPTURE, Sotheby's, New York, May 22, 1991 [sale catalogue]).
132 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 344.
133
Id.

134id.

id.
I35

13 6 id.
137 O'Keefe

& Prott, supranote 11, at 344.
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protection.' 38 The question that is asked is whether the Dutch buyer has a
right against the auctioneer or against the seller/consignor. 39 Dutch law delineates two different types of agency. 40 The first one, "middellijke
vertegenworrdiging," occurs when the auctioneer, as the intermediary, acts
in his own name. 141 The second one, "onmiddellijke vertegenwoordiging",
occurs when the auctioneer acts as an intermediary in the name of the
seller.142 Dutch auction houses usually operate under the latter form of
agency, and thus, once the hammer falls, the buyer has a direct contractual
relationship with the seller, and the auctioneer is not liable to the buyer in
most instances.143 If the auction house operates under "onmiddellijke
vertegenworrdiging," and a buyer finds that an item bought does not conform to the description in the auction catalogue, the buyer can claim damages against the seller. 144 Similarly, if the auction house acts in the name of
the seller, and the buyer finds that the item bought has "hidden defects," the
buyer can take action against the seller, not the auctioneer. 45 However, if
the auctioneer "knew or should have known" about the defect in the item46
while the seller did not know, then the auctioneer is liable to the buyer.,
In a Dutch case, the Amsterdam District Court ruled that a seller who refused to allow an auctioneer to utilize the services of an outside expert to
determine the authenticity of the seller's work, could not turn around and
"attach" the assets of the auctioneer. 147
Thus, the duty and liability of the auctioneer to the buyer varies within
the United States, Britain, France and the Netherlands. 48 The American
court cases establish that art merchants-which include auctioneers-are
liable for express warranties of authenticity for items sold to buyers. Interestingly, the recent case of Pritzker (which incorporates Balog) suggests a
stringent standard be applied to individual art merchants ("sufficient investigation") in determining whether they personally breached an express warranty of authenticity. In addition, both Sotheby's and Christie's-which
have operations in both New York and London-have 49implemented their
own system of express warranty and limited liability.'

138

Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 354.
supra note 26, at 393.

139Boll,

140 Id.
141Id.
142 id.

Id. at 394.
" Id. at 395.

143

S45Boll, supra
46 Id. at 396.

147

note 26, at 395-96.

Id. (citing an unpublished judgment from Amsterdam District Court, July 12, 1990,

KG 90/1227 KK).
148 Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 355-56.
149 Bennett, supra note 1, at 276.
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In contrast, France remains relatively rigid in not finding the stateappointed auctioneer liable for much of anything against the buyer. 150 Indeed, it will be interesting to see the developments in French auction law,
now that
there will no longer be a monopoly of state-appointed auction5
eers.1 1
Finally, while the Netherlands has strong consumer protection, that
protection is52based mostly in the buyer's rights against the seller, not the
auctioneer.
Thus, on the surface, it appears that American auctioneers, compared
to those in the Netherlands and France, have a much greater chance of being found liable to the buyer for a breach of warranty of authenticity. Thus,
it would be logical to assume that American auctioneers (and those associated with Sotheby's and Christies, in the United States and Britain) may be
more apt to be diligent in their dealings with buyers. However, this is not
necessarily the case, as the issue is complicated by the overlapping of duties
to the seller, the buyer and the public. The following sections will explore
the difficulty of reconciling an auctioneer's duty to the seller, buyer, and
public and the way in which illegal practices by the auction industry have
been able to escape, at least until recently, the radar of auction regulation.
IV. INADEQUATE REGULATION OF THE AUCTIONEER'S DUTY?

Traditionally, common law countries, such as the United States and
Great Britain, have not heavily regulated their domestic auction industries
because, in general, these countries do not strictly regulate private actions
between parties.' 53 In contrast, civil law countries, such as France, have
traditionally strictly regulated their auction industry. 154 This is evidenced
by the state's control over the auction industry, as described above, of making auctioneers state agents.155 In fact, French auctioneering rules appear to
be the most structured of all the major auction countries. t5 6 However, author Stuart Bennett asserts that as a result of the deceptive practices in
Cristallina,New York City created new regulations for auctioneering practices. 157 To the curiosity of the auction world, New York has been the place
where the most conflicts over the duties of auction houses have arisen. 158
Consequently, New York has proven to be "the principal litigation arena for
15o
See O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 344.
151See PrisedOpen, supra note 35, at 53.
152 See generally Boll, supra note 26, at 393-96.
53See Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 354.
54

1 Id. at 353.

155
Id.;
see also O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 341.
156
Reeves & Boll, supra note 2,at 353.
157 Bennett, supra note 1, at 258; see also O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 342, 358.
158Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 356.
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defining the role of auction houses."15 9

This section will analyze the auctioneering regulations enacted in
New York City. The New York City regulations serve as an example of the
difficult nature of reconciling the auctioneer's duty to the seller, the buyer
and the public, while attempting to address the current controversial practices of the auction industry.
Bennett asserts that the regulations that were enacted by New York
City post-Cristallinaclarify the auctioneer's duties in relation to the consignor. 16 Indeed, the newly instated New York City Department of Consumer Affairs regulations do control auctioneers practices more now
because the auctioneers must disclose certain information that was previously only known by the auction house and the consignor. 161 Interestingly,
however, another author asserts that many of the current regulations of auctioneering practices in the United States actually "harm the consignor in order to benefit potential buyers and the public.' 62 Indeed, many of the
regulations enacted by the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs
appear to be concerned more about the interest of the buyer and public as
63
opposed to the relationship between the auctioneer and seller.'
Under Section 2-122(1) of the Rules of the City of New York, Department of Consumer Affairs, the auction house must disclose to the public the
fact that a work is being sold subject to a set reserve price.' 64 And under
Section 2-123(b), "bidding off the chandelier" (as described above) is not
allowed to occur before bidding on a lot has reached its reserve price,
unless the auction house publishes to the public that it plans to do so. 165
While the New York City regulations still do not require the auction house
to reveal what the reserve price is, 166 there is clearly a concern that the pub159 Id. at 356-57; see also Bennett, supra note 1 (discussing generally how the creation of
more regulations in New York City was sparked by the extensive litigation involving auction
houses).
60 Bennett, supra note 1, at 284.
161Id. at 282.
162 Contreras, supra note 3, at 730, 738 (at page 738, Contreras asserts, "Such concerns
[for fairness in the auction process] can be seen in consumer protection legislation regulating
auctioneers' disclosures. Under the Consumer Affairs Code of New York City, for example,
art auctioneers are held to fairly rigid standards of truthfulness in both pre- and post-auction
reporting and advertising."); see also McGill, supra note 5, at C20 (discussing how the case
of Cristallinaas well as other litigation auction houses have faced, brought about "consumer
complaints about such auction practices" and thus New York City was looking to appease
the consumer complaints when enacting new regulations); O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11,
at 342 ("Approximately 13 new regulations were added in an attempt to recognize and regulate the changing market place in New York City.").
163 See Contreras, supra note 3, at 737-38; see also McGill,
supra note 5, at C20.
1646 Rules of the City of New York § 2-122 (2001); see also Bennett, supra note 1, at
264, 266, 282.
165 6 Rules of the City of New York § 2-123 (b) (2001).
166 See McGill, supra note 5, at C20 ("[T]he Art Dealers Assoc. of America campaigned
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lic has knowledge that a reserve exists. 67
More telling, however, is Section 2-123 (a). It states: "If the reserve
price is not bid, the auctioneer may withdraw a lot from sale. At the time of
such withdrawal, and before bidding on another lot begins, the auctioneer
shall announce that the withdrawn lot has been 'passed,' 'withdrawn,' 'returned to owner,' or 'bought-in." 68 It is asserted that this regulation is in
response to the Cristallinadisaster wherein Bathurst deceived the public by
stating that three paintings had been sold, but had instead secretly returned
two of the paintings to Jodido at the auction through the "buy in" process,
obviously without the audience's awareness. 169 Again, there is concern for
educating the public about at least some of the behind-the-scenes maneuvers performed by auctioneers.
Finally, New York appears to protect the auction house-consumer relationship more rigidly when dealing with the issue of the auction house
"guarantee."'' 70 New York addresses the issue of the "guarantee" by mandating that the auction house disclose to the public when it has an interest in
a consignor's work.171 So, if an auction house guarantees a minimum price
to a consignor for a work, the auction house must share that information
with the public by disclosing it in the catalogue or other materials that are
published in connection with the auction.' 72 This regulation helps the buyer
by informing him that the auction house has a literal and figurative interest
in a specific work.173 However, even though New York mandates disclosure of guarantees, New York is still not eradicating the use of guarantees
by auction houses.' 74 It is the general use of guarantees that has created
controversy in the auction world. 175
Thus, these regulations make it clear that it is difficult to reconcile the
auctioneer's duty to the seller, buyer and public. New York has certainly
attempted to emphasize the fiduciary role of the auctioneer-as seen by the
Cristallinadecision as well as the subsequent New York City Rules. However, as will be shown briefly, such attempts have failed miserably. Similarly, the American court cases dealing with the auctioneer's duty to the
against the secret reserve," but the auction houses ended up winning the battle. Thus, New
York City does not compel auction houses to disclose the actual reserve price).
167See Contreras, supranote 3, at 743, 745; see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 283.
168
6 Rules of the City of New York § 2-123 (a) (2001) (emphasis added).
169Bennett, supra note 1, at 264; O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 358.
170
See Contreras, supranote 3, at 730, 738, 747-48.
1716 Rules of the City of New York § 2-122 (d) (2001); see also Bennett, supra note 1, at
282.
172
6 Rules of the City of New York § 2-122 (d) (2001); see also Bennett, supra note 1, at
282.
173See Contreras, supra note 3, at 747.
174See id.

175
See id.; see also McGill, supra note 5, at C20.
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buyer through express warranty have clearly not been sufficient to thoroughly regulate the auctioneering practices in the United States. While the
Dawson and Pritzker decisions (as well as Sotheby's and Christie's express

warranty liability clauses) map out the auctioneer's duty not to misrepresent
to the buyer the authenticity of a given piece of art, there have yet to be
cases that address other, more deceptive breaches of duty to the buyer.
While New York attempts to regulate the auctioneer's fiduciary duty to the
seller in a way that enhances the rights of the buyer and the public, 176 the
problems discussed above, including the controversial practices of secret
reserves and guarantees, seem to slip through the regulatory cracks. The
ineffective regulations have been exacerbated by the severe competition
within the auction industry, resulting in appalling breaches to the buyers
and ultimately, criminal behavior within the auction industry. 7 7
V. ILLEGAL PRACTICES BY AUCTION HOUSES

This paper has thus far established that big international auction houses
(including Sotheby's and Christie's) have both formal and informal duties
to the seller, the buyer, and the public. 78 Even in other countries, such as
France, where the auctioneer has essentially no duties to the buyer, the auctioneer is a state official, and his general duties as an auctioneer are taken
quite seriously and given the utmost respect. 7 9 However, the regulations in
the auction industry are hardly containing the practices of the auction
houses, particularly in the United States (New York) and in the large international auction houses (Sotheby's and Christie's). 80 So why are these duties not working to curb the behavior of the large auction houses? There are
several reasons. As discussed above, even the regulations that address the
controversial practices in the auction industry - including secret reserves
and guarantees - still do not solve the problem.' 8' It has been asserted that
the auction industry has outgrown the use of the law of agency. 82 The
large auction houses, including Sotheby's and Christies are "multi-national
corporation[s]," not individual agents. 83 In addition, even with the duties
176 See generally Contreras, supra note 3, at 738; see also Contreras, supra note 162 and
accompanying text.
177 See Contreras, supra note 3, at 740.
t78 See Bennett, supra note 1, at 284 (discussing throughout the article the auctioneers'

duties to seller, buyer and public); see also Contreras, supra note 3, at 719 (also discussing
throughout the article the auctioneers' duties to seller, buyer and public).
17 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 344.
180See Contreras, supra note 3, at 729.
181Id. at 730, 750-52 (discussing how the auction industry is improperly regulated and offers suggestions on how to properly regulate it at pages 750-52); see Reeves & Boll, supra
note 2, at 353.
182 Contreras, supra note 3, at 730; see also Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 353.
183Contreras, supra note 3, at 730.
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and regulations of the auctioneers, something else wins outcompetition. 184 There is severe competition between the auction houses to
get the sexiest, most coveted consignments.1 85 And with all of the aggressive competition within the international auction industry, the auction
houses are providing complex services, financial and otherwise, in an atmosphere of paltry and ineffective regulation. 8 6 This competition has
clearly driven out respectable behavior by the auction houses and replaced
it with embarrassing "cut-throat" competition.' 87
This severe competition has culminated in the ultimate illegal business
maneuver: price-fixing. 8 8 On December 5, 2001, the chairman of
Sotheby's, A. Alfred Taubman, was convicted of violating federal anti-trust
law for conspiring with the chairman of Christie's, Sir Anthony Tennant, to
fix consignment commission prices between the two monster auction
houses between 1993 and 1999.189 During the sixteen-day trial in federal
district court in New York City, prosecutors alleged that both Taubman and
Tennant fixed seller's commissions.190 That is, they agreed on a fixed rate
to charge consignors - preventing consignors from bargaining over fees, and
allowing the auction houses to create more profit for themselves and keep
other competitors out of the market.'91 Indeed, Sotheby's and Christie's
control approximately 90% of the auction art market; 192 thus, by fixing
seller's commissions, they ensured that no other auction houses received the
amount of business both Sotheby's and Christie's would receive.' 93 It is estimated that in the six-year period in which the two auction houses schemed
to fix consignor commissions, consignors were cheated out of approxi-

184 Bennett, supra note 1, at 257-58 (Bennett also discusses competition between auction
houses throughout his article); McGill, supra note 5, at C20.

185 Bennett, supra note 1, at 259; Affairs of the Art, supra note 100, at 53; McGill, supra

note 5, at C20.
186 See Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 357. See also Contreras, supra note 3, at 730.
187 See McGill, supra note 5, at C20 ("[T]he increasingly fierce competition among auction houses, especially between Sotheby's and Christie's, is often cited as a root cause for
incidents such as the false reports from Christie's on its 1981 Impressionist auction...."); see
also Bennett, supra note 1,at 257-59.
'88 See Dixon, supra note 7; see also Joshua Chaffin, Christie's Settles Class Action Lawsuit, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 27, 2000, at 42; see also Shauna Snow, Morning Report
Arts and Entertainment Reports from the Times, News Services and the Nation's Press: Art,
Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 27, 2000, at F2.

189 Blumenthal & Vogel, supra note 17, at Al.
190 Id.; Dixon, supra note 7.
191Blumenthal & Vogel, supra note 17, at A I; John Goldman, Sotheby's Former Chairman Jailed, THE AGE Apr. 24, 2002, at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/04/23/
1019441243127.html (last visited 9/22/2002).

192 Joshua Chaffin, Sotheby's Ex-Head Guilty of Price Fixing, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001,
at 12.
193Dixon, supra note 7.
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194
mately $100 million.
Diana Brooks, Taubman's "proteg&" and Sotheby's former CEO, cooperated with the prosecution by pleading guilty to one criminal count of
antitrust violation. 95 Brooks acted as the main witness against Taubman in
an attempt to avoid, or at least lessen, her own prison sentence. 96 Brooks
testified that Sotheby's had been getting "killed on the bottom line" for
making unprofitable concessions to clients in order to beat out Christie's for
the consignments.' 97 She stated that Taubman directed her to "suppress and
eliminate competition,"' 98 ordering her to meet several times secretly with
Christie's (former) chief executive, Christopher Davidge, in order to make
sure the two auction houses did not undercut each other by charging different sellers' commissions. 199 In the end, Brooks received three years of probation, including a six-month sentence of house arrest.2 00 Brooks was also

fined $350,000 and given 1,000 hours of community service.2 0 '

Christopher Davidge, Christie's (former) CEO and key player in the
price-fixing scheme, also cooperated with the U.S. Department of Justice,
thus receiving conditional immunity for revealing evidence of Taubman's
involvement.2 °2
On April 22, 2002, Taubman was sentenced to one year and one day in
prison, and fined $7.5 million.20 3 While the Justice Department, which
prosecuted Taubman, argued for a maximum three-year prison term, the
Federal Probation Department surprisingly recommended no prison time for
Taubman (citing, in part, debilitating health conditions) . 4 The sentencing
judge, while not giving Taubman the maximum sentence, gave the appearance of exceeding disapproval of Taubman's actions, likening Taubman's
194
Carol Vogel & Ralph Blumenthal, Ex-Chairman of Sotheby's Gets Jail Time: His Role
in PriceFixing Brings a Year and a Day, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at B 1.

195
Paul Lieberman, Trial Opens in Sotheby's Price-FixingCase, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2001, at Al8.
196 Blumenthal & Vogel, supra note 17, at A27.
97

1 See Joshua Chaffin, Sotheby's May Face its Own Sale of the Century: Following the
Conviction of its Former Chairman,the Auction House is Expected to Go on the Block, FIN.
TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 8, 2002, at 26.

198 Lieberman, supra note 195, at A18.
99

1 Id,

200 Ralph Blumenthal & Carol Vogel, Ex-Chief of Sotheby's Gets Probationand Fine,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2002, at B3.
201 Id.
202 Chaffin, supra note 192, at 12; Lieberman, supra note 195, at AI8; Chaffin, supra

note 188, at 42.
203 Vogel & Blumenthal, supra note 17, at B.

Taubman was denied an appeal by the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; see Hope Reeves, Metro Briefing
New York: Manhattan:No Retrialfor Ex-Sotheby Head,N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2002, at B6.
204 Ralph Blumenthal & Carol Vogel, No Prison Time Is Recommended in Sotheby's
Price-FixingCase, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2002, at B 1; Blumenthal & Vogel, supra note 17, at
BI.
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20 5

crime to a "robbery."
Interestingly, Sir Anthony Tennant, the chairman of Christie's and
Taubman's alleged co-conspirator, was not forced to stand trial in the
United States, because under British law price-fixing is not a crime20 6 and,
thus, Tennant could not be extradited.20 7 Prior to Taubman's trial, however,
both Sotheby's and Christie's settled a civil class action suit for $512 million brought by former consignors of the auction houses who were cheated
as a result of the price-fixing scheme. Taubman paid $156 million of
Sotheby's share out of his own pocket.20 8 In April 2002, over a year after
Taubman's conviction, European antitrust officials formally charged both
Sotheby's and Christie's with price-fixing.20 9 Yet, Sotheby's will escape
any further criminal prosecution (and Christie's will escape all criminal
prosecution), because the European Commission "has no authority to pursue a criminal investigation." 210 Instead, if found guilty after adjudication
of the charges by the European Commission, the two auction 2houses
may
11
face civil fines of up to 10% of their annual worldwide sales.
When Christie's (in New York in 1975) and Sotheby's (in 1976) first
introduced the "buyer's premium"-a percentage of the final price of the
good the buyer must pay the auction house - it created controversy in the
auction world.21 2 The initial reason for introducing the "buyer's premium"
was because "the commission from the seller was not covering costs and
21 3
did not seem susceptible to an increase if business was to be retained.,
Indeed, it was thought that Sotheby's and Christie's colluded to instate the
buyer's premium. 2 14 The Office of Fair Trading eventually dismissed the
allegation, concluding that there was no proof of "actual collusion. ''2 15 Regardless of a finding of no "actual collusion," it appears that possible illegal
colluding-or at least strong suspicions of such-between the two auction
Blumenthal & Vogel, supra note 17, at B1.
Dixon, supra note 7; Fixingfor a Fight, ECONOMIST.COM, Apr. 18, 2002, at http://
www.economist.co.uk/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=1087375&CFID=548952&CFTOKE
N=40035349& (last visited 9/23/2003).
207 Paul Meller, International Business; Europe Says Art Auction Houses Fixed
Prices,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2002, at C3. It came out at trial that Taubman had at least 12 private
meetings with Tennant in Taubman's London and New York apartments, between the years
1993 and 1996, presumably to perpetuate the price-fixing scheme; Blumental & Vogel, su205

206

pra note 17, at A27.
208 Blumenthal & Vogel, supra note 17, at A27.

209 Meller, supranote 207, at C3.
210
ld.
211 id.

212 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 365-66.
213 Id. at 365.
214 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11,

at 366 (citing BRIAN W. HARVEY & FRANKLIN

MEISEL, AUCTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 126 (1st ed. Butterworths London 1985)).
215 id.
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houses was fermenting early on, at least since the 1970s. Increasing profitability would, of course, be a main reason for the two auction houses to collude.216 One art dealer suggested that without the collusive prices Christie's
and Sotheby's maintained from 1993-1999, the two auction houses will go
back to making "zero return[s] on [their] investment[s]. 2 17 This may be so,
regardless of the fact that the two houses together actually control 90% of
the auction art market.218 Indeed, even in 1998, while Sotheby's was colluding
with Christie's, it only brought in approximately $54 million in prof19
its.

2

However, the greedy, profit-driven behavior of Sotheby's and
Christie's, while dampening the aura surrounding the high-brow auction industry, 220 has far from destroyed the reputation of the art auction world.
Immediately after Taubman's criminal conviction was announced in December 2001, Sotheby's stock, of which Taubman owned a controlling
share (22.5%),221 rose by 12 percent. 222 This seemingly odd occurrence was
soon overshadowed by the share price of Sotheby's dropping to $17 in
January of 2002 - a rather stark contrast from its value of $40 that was
maintained two years earlier, before awareness of the price-fixing scandal
permeated the public.223 However, the auction industry is still standing

strong. Some speculate that the art world is far from permanently damaged-both Sotheby's and Christie's continued to attract sellers and buyers
of exquisitely expensive artwork even after Taubman was convicted. 2
What remains of the price-fixing scandal after the dust has settled is
the troubling truth-a huge civil settlement and a criminal conviction in an
industry that has traditionally been revered for its class and prestige. 225 The
United States legal system seems to be unable to thoroughly address the
problems in the industry. A less-than-severe prison sentence for the collud-

216
217
218

Chaffin, supra note 197, at 26.

id.
Chaffin, supra note 192, at 1.

219 Id. The reason for such low profits is explained by the unbearably expensive overhead

endured by the auction industry-the profits from the rare, ultra high-priced items (Monets,
Picassos, and others) are usually spent attempting to attract customers to the majority of the
auction house's inventory-much less expensive items (including furniture, jewelry and
baseball cards).
220 Chaffin, supra note 197, at 26 ("Mr. Taubman's trial offered a less than
flattering
advertisement for his business.").
22'FT McCarthy, Not Such a Pretty Picture,THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 10, 2001, at 60.
222 Chaffin, supra note 192, at 1.
223 Chaffin, supra note 197, at 26.
224
See Antony Thorncroft, A Topsy Turvy Saleroom Drama: This Year Auctioneers Have
Set Records and Suffered Legal Turmoil, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 22, 2001, at 7 ("The
remarkable thing is that the dirty linen so publicly washed has hardly affected Sotheby's and
Christie's ability to attract works of art to sell.").
225 See generally Chaffin, supra note 197, at 26.
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ing activity of a high profile actor in the auction world is simply not enough
to curb the slippery behavior of the auction industry, nor curb the interest
and support of the public.
Likewise, a six-month term of house arrest for Taubman's side-kick,
Diana Brooks, in which she has been "confined" to her upscale apartment in
the Upper East Side of Manhattan, is hardly going to put fear into potential
future illegal actors in the auction world.22 6 In addition, with the settling of
cases like Cristallina,blatant displays of breaches of duties (to sellers, buyers, and the public) by auctioneers get swept under the rug and the courts, at
least in America, are rarely given a chance to properly punish or make examples of such behavior.22 7
In addition to everything else, the lack of desire, ability, or both, of international regulation of the auction industry is also partly responsible for
the unchecked behavior of the auction industry.22 8 The paltry international
regulation is apparent in the way the international community has addressed
the issue of the trade of stolen art by private institutions.
VI. LACK OF REGULATION OF THE AUCTION INDUSTRY BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The competition in the international auction industry is causing the
embarrassing behavior by the auction houses. 229 By committing these civil
wrongs and crimes, the auction houses are not only rebuffing their duty to
seller, buyer, and public, but are blatantly putting their own interest above
buyer, seller, and public.230 One of the problems lies in the fact that cohesive international regulation (of both the services offered and the liability
assumed)
of the international auction house industry does not appear to exT

ist.
it231
226

See Blumenthal & Vogel, supranote 200, at B3.
Bennett, supra note 1, at 264 (asking the question, "Can the law provide measures

227 See

to prevent ... [the misconduct] in the fine art auction market?" and asserting that with the
settlement of the Cristallina case it is difficult to know how the courts will treat other wrongful acts by auctioneers, or whether the law can contain such practices).
228 See generally O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 350 (discussing the lack of "harmonization" of international laws regulating the auction industry).
229 See Bennett, supra note 1, at 257-58, 262 (discussing the competition between
Sotheby's and Christie's in the New York market); see also McGill, supra note 5, at Al.
230 See Bennett, supra note 1, at 262 ("Such competition does not directly oppose a consignor's interest; it can result in lower commission rates for example. It may however, also
result in a conflict of interest, since an auction house may place its own interest before that
of its client."). I argue that when the international auction houses commit such criminal activity as price-fixing, the houses are putting their interest above their client, the buyer, and
the public. See also Contreras, supra note 3, at 730 (arguing that the auctioneer has duties to
seller, buyer and public and that auction houses are poorly regulated because of the complexity of duties required of modem auction houses).
231See O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 349 (suggesting that an "international
harmonization" of the auction industry is possible in the future).
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The concern for proper regulations for the great auction houses has
arisen from the development of the present international art market. These
auction houses have played a significant role in developing this market
where the leading auction houses in the major centers are engaged in
worldwide competition to attract the most important objects and an international clientele.23 2
It has been suggested by some that "harmonizing... international auction sales conditions" is difficult because of the varying national regulations.233 Specifically, it would be difficult to "harmonize" countries that
have stricter regulations, such as France, with other "looser" countries. 3
However, as noted above, it was just recently reported that the French state
agents-commissariespriseurs-no longer have a monopoly over art auctions.235 This is an interesting development that allows international auction
houses, such as Christie's and Sotheby's, into the French market.2 36 This
suggests that in the future, we may see more uniform activity by international auction houses. 237 However, this by no means allays the competition
between international auction houses.238 In fact, there has not been a serious enough effort by the international community, and particularly, America and Britain, to enforce international treaties that address the selling of
stolen art. 2 39 This is a reflection of America's and Britain's lack of desire
and ability to generally address illegal activities (not just the selling of stolen art) committed by the large international auction houses such as
Sotheby's and Christie S.240
A. UNESCO
The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibitingand Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transferof Ownership of Cultural
Propertywas a "comprehensive international attempt" to curb the illicit
trade of stolen art between countries.241 In 1972, the United States ratified
monization" of the auction industry is possible in the future).
232 Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 353-54.
233 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 350.
234

Id.

PrisedOpen, supra note 35, at 53.
236 id.
237 See id.; see generally O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 350.
238 Prised Open, supra note 35, at 53 (asserting that, in fact, the entrance of auction
houses such as Sotheby's and Christie's into France may create even more intense competition).
239 See Shinn, supra note 18, at 978; see also Michelle Kunitz, Switzerland
& The InternationalTrade in Art & Antiquities, 21 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 519, 525-36 (2001).
240 See McGill, supra note 5, at C20.
241 Shinn, supra note 18, at 980; UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Movement of Art
235

Treasures (reproduced from the text provided by the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization), 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971)[hereinafter UNESCO Convention]; see
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the UNESCO treaty.2 42 "The UNESCO Convention effectively makes it illegal to remove cultural property from a member country without its permission. 243 However, the United States "accepted" UNESCO with several
244
caveats.
Most interesting is the U.S. treatment of Article 7(a) of
UNESCO.245 Article 7(a) of UNESCO imparts on the parties to the Convention:
to take the necessary measures, consistent with national legislation, to prevent
museums and similar institutions within their territories from acquiring cultural
property originating in another State Party which has been illegally exported
after entry into force of this Convention ....
,,246
At the request of the U.S. delegation to the Convention, Article 7(a) would
only apply to state-run museums.247 Thus, the problem is that,
While control over state-run museums is a given, the real problems of illicit
transfer and import of cultural property lie in the acquisition policies of private
museums, institutions, and collectors, because they are much more difficult to
monitor. Article [7a] fails to control the illegal art trade, especially as it concers non-state-run museums and institutions.248
Auction houses would appear to fall under the category of "non-state-run..
. institutions" that deal in art. Thus, the UNESCO convention does not directly deal with the auction house industry. 249 However, the UNESCO
Convention does make some small attempt at addressing private institutions
that deal in art trade.250 In Article 10, UNESCO states that the parties to the
Convention shall attempt to
[R]estrict by education, information and vigilance, movement of cultural property illegally removed from any State Party to this Convention and, as appropriate for each country, oblige antique dealers, subject to penal or
administrative sanctions, to maintain a register recording the origin of each
item of cultural property, names and addresses of the supplier, description and
O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 726; see Kunitz, supra note 239, at 528.
242Shinn, supra note 18, at 981.
243 Kunitz, supra note 239, at 529.
244 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 794; Shinn, supra note 18, at 981.
245 Id. at 794; Shinn, supra note 18, at 987.
246 UNESCO Convention, supra note 241, art. 7(a); see Shinn, supra note

18, at 987; see
also O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 797 (asserting that the United States never even
adopted Article 7(a) of UNESCO in its own domestic implementation of UNESCO, the 1983
Convention on Cultural Implementation Act).
247 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 745; Shinn, supra note 18, at 987.
248 Shinn, supra note 18, at 993.
249 UNESCO Convention supra note 241; see also Shinn, supra note 18, at 987; see also
Kunitz, supra note 239, at 520.
250 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 760-61.
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price of each item sold and to inform the purchaser of the cultural property of
the export prohibition to which such property may be subject ....
The fact that only "antique dealers" are mentioned in Article 10 is a peculiarity noted by authors O'Keefe and Prott 252 O'Keefe and Prott cite another
commentator, Fraoua, who asserts that Article 10 "requires States to control
dealers in antiquities and 'all other dealers in culturalgoods' to keep a register., 253 If this were the case, then one could assume that auction houses
fall within the category of "all other dealers in cultural goods" and that auction houses should diligently keep a register of all the goods they consign
and sell. 5 However, O'Keefe and Prott note that even if this were the intention of the drafters of UNESCO, it simply "does not appear in the
text.' ' 255 This point is moot in the United States, as the United States did not
adopt Article 10 of UNESCO in its domestic legislation of the Convention. 256
Until 2001, the United States had been the only "significant artimporting [nation]" to sign the agreement and implement the Convention
domestically. 257 In 2001, Britain also signed onto the Convention.2 58 In
1989, O'Keefe and Prott wrote that, "clearly the major contribution of the
big auction houses to the British economy, and their influence in public life,
have been most significant in that government's lack of response to the
259
Convention.,
It is thought that Britain finally signed on to the Convention in order to
gain "leverage for political bargaining. 26 ° O'Keefe and Prott also note that
there had been strong opposition by "certain [private] dealers in [the United
States]" to implementing the United States' domestic version of UNESCO,
The 1983 Convention on Cultural PropertyImplementation Act
(C.C.P.I.A.). 261 The opposition by the auction houses in Britain and the

251 UNESCO Convention, supra note 241, art. 10(a) (emphasis added); see also O'Keefe
& Prott, supra note 11, at 760-61.
252 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 760.
253 Id at 761 (citing R. Fraoua, Convention Concernant les Mesures a Prendre Pour Interdire et Empecher L 'Importation,L 'Exportationet le Transfert de Propriete Illicites des
Biens Culturels 83 (UNESCO Doc. CC-86/WS/40) (1986)) (emphasis added).
254 See O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 761; see also Shinn, supra note 18, at 993 (asserting that UNESCO does not address private institutions).
255 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 761.
256 Id. at 797; Shinn, supra note 18, at 989.
257 Shinn, supra note 18, at 982; see also Kunitz, supra note 239, at 529; see also
O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 786.
258 Kunitz, supra note 239, at 529; Dalya Alberge, Britain Acts to Prevent Illicit Trade in
Art, THE TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 15, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library.
259 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 786; see also Shinn, supra note 18, n. 27.
260 Kunitz, supra note 239, at 529.
261 O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 786; see also Shinn, supra note 18, n. 27.

459

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

23:433 (2003)

private dealers in the United States clearly shows that the private interest
(which I argue includes auction houses) was consciously aware that illicit
art was being traded and did not want to have to deal with the consequences
of having stricter industry regulations by enacting a treaty such as
UNESCO.26 2

B. UNIDROIT
An even clearer example of the way in which the interests of the auction houses win out over international attempts to regulate illegal activity in
the international art market is the treatment of the UNIDROIT Convention
by Western countries. The UNIDROIT Convention came about when, acknowledging UNESCO's feeble impact on international art regulation,
UNESCO approached UNIDROIT (International Institute for the Unification of Private Law) to create a second international treaty that sought to,
"reduce illicit traffic in cultural objects by expanding the rights upon which
return of such objects [could] be sought..." 263 The UNIDROIT Convention
sought to establish "common, minimal legal rules" between states for the
restitution of illegally traded art objects, as well as "enhance international
co-operationand maintain a proper role for legal trading and inter-State
agreements for cultural exchanges. 264 Importantly, the UNIDROIT Convention, recognizing UNESCO's shortcomings, sought to include private
collections of art into the definition of covered cultural property. 265 This inclusion would undoubtedly have a serious effect on the auction houses, particularly Sotheby's and Christie's. Some argue that there is no question that
international stolen artifacts create a lucrative business for international
auction houses (including Sotheby's and Christie's). 266 The following provides an example of the auction houses profiting off of stolen cultural property: in 1997 it was discovered that three of six notorious art objects stolen
from museums or looted from archeological sites in Cambodia were later
267
sold at Sotheby's.
But alas, serious international cooperation regarding regulation of the
illicit trade of art was not to be. Most Western countries have refused to

262 See Kunitz, supra note 239, at 519-20 (asserting that art auction houses consistently
deal in illicit art); see generally O'Keefe & Prott, supranote 11, at 786.
263International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT): Final Act of
the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M.
1322, 1322 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention], available at http://www.unidroit.org/
english/conventions/c-cult.htm (last visited 9/23/2003).
264 id. at 1330 (emphasis added).
265Kunitz, supra note 239, at 530.

266 Id. at 519-20.
267 UnplunderingArt, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 1997, available at 1997 WL 17832850.
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sign the UNIDROIT Convention, much less enforce it, because they are
afraid it will hurt their art markets.268 Importantly, it is acknowledged that
Britain is "anxious to protect the interest of its two great auction houses" Sotheby's and Christies - and thus, refuses to sign the UNIDROIT Convention. 269 Because Britain has one of the largest auction industries in the
world, Britain's protection of its auction industry effectively frustrates any
international attempts to create common regulations across states in the international art auction industry.
UNESCO provides a weak (if not non-existent) attempt to regulate the
selling of illicit art in the auction industry.270 While ratification of
UNIDROIT by all nations with lucrative auction industries would have effectively regulated the auction industry's participation in the selling of stolen art, the countries with the most at stake, including Britain, have refused
to sign. Obviously, the selling of illicit art is only part of the problem of the
auction industry. However, the weak, and ultimately, failed attempts by the
international community to address the issue of the selling of illicit art in
auction industry virtually unregulated by the inauction houses has left the
271
ternational community.
Another example of the international community's lack of influence in
the regulation of the auction industry is the way in which the European
Commission will handle the recent Sotheby's/Christie's price-fixing scandal-the "punishment" will be a mere civil fine.272 As hefty as the fine may
be, the European Commission does not even have the authority to pursue a
criminal investigation.2 73
VII. WHY THE AUCTION INDUSTRY CONTINUES TO THRIVE
Glamour, prestige and class are traditionally what comes to mind for
most people when the names "Sotheby's" or "Christie's" are mentioned.2 74
And, I would argue, it is this very traditional view of auction houses that allows the auction industry to slip through cracks and remain275under the radar
of strict regulation-both domestically and internationally.
Even traditionally strict regulating countries, such as France, have

268

id.

id.
See Shinn, supra note 18, at 993; see also Kunitz, supra note 239, at 520.
271 See generally Shinn, supra note 18, at 978.
272 Meller, supra note 207, at C3.
269
270

273 id.

See Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 360-6 1; see also Chaffin, supra note 197.
See id. (noting that the public is "entranced by the prestige, the glamour and the excitement of entering the art market," in addition to "being possessors of some of the greatest
examples of mankind's achievement," and for that, are willing to forego "strict regulations"
on auction houses).
274
275
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loosened their grip on the auction industry,276 seemingly as a result of the
excitement and allure surrounding the big auction houses. Up until 2001,
France had the strictest rules regulating their auction practices.2 77 However,
the decision in December 2001 to liberalize the French auction market by
allowing in the big competitors (Sotheby's/Christie's) is quite telling. 278 It
is clear that by eliminating the monopoly of state-agent (commissariespriseurs) control over public art auctions, France desires to bring in more
competition and more profit from the glamorous and prestigious auction industry (particularly into Paris). 279 For instance, prior to this new law, the
commissariespriseurs charged fixed fees, set by the government of France,
which were considered low by international standards. 280 As a result of the
new change in France, the commissariespriseurs will be able to set their
own fees--developing a new "sense" of competition that never before existed. 28' Regardless of the scandals that surround the big auction house
competitors, such as Sotheby's and Christie's, France is also drawn in by
the allure of the exciting and, some would argue, unchecked competition of
the auction industry.
While it is true that Sotheby's and Christie's were finally caught redhanded in the price-fixing scandal, there is something unique about the art
auction world that continues to allow the industry to thrive.282 Even with
the numerous illegal activities committed by the auction houses (pricefixing, misrepresentation, selling stolen art), the business still holds a strong
reputation and maintains prestige and glamour. 283 It seems the glamour and
prestige of the auction industry blind the public, 284 and, one could argue, the
legal system as well. Taubman's one-year prison sentence for a six-year
scheme of collusion, bilking clients out of $100 million, seems a bit lenient.
Prior to sentencing, ninety luminaries, including former President Gerald
Ford, Queen Noor al-Hussein of Jordan, and former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, wrote testimonial letters to the court, lauding Taubman's
good character and attempting to sway the court toward leniency, though
the judge who sentenced Taubman would be hard-pressed to admit it.285
These letters may have had an effect on the court's decision in sentencing
Taubman. It can certainly be argued that Taubman's role at Sotheby's

276 See PrisedOpen, supra note 35, at 53.
277 See Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 354.
278 See PrisedOpen, supra note 35, at 53.
279 See id.
280 id.
281 Id.

282 See Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 360-61.
283 See generally id.
284 See supra note 275.

285 Blumenthal & Vogel, supra note 194, at BI.
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helped him gain so many luminaries as "friends." Without doubt, the auction industry is an exciting place--drawing in former presidents, queens,
and sometimes, as in Taubman's case, criminals.
A.

Auction Houses are Not Just Businesses

Some argue that auction houses are important and viable sources of
economic activity. 286 The auction industry should not be weighed down by
"undue administrative problems," but rather, should be allowed to thrive as
viable businesses. 287 Too many regulations may constrict the activity of
auction houses; 288 however, too few regulations have led to criminal behavior by the two largest auction houses. What needs to be recognized is that
the auction industry is not merely a business. The glamour and prestige of
selling magnificent works of art do make auction houses unique and complex entities.289 It is essential that auction houses be specially regulated so
as not to tarnish and cheapen the art they sell; it is important that auction
houses are not consideredjust businesses. Indeed, auction houses dabble in
extraordinary works of art-not the subject of most multi-billion dollar
businesses.29 °
Ironically, even though auction houses should not be considered mere
businesses, they have to be regulated in certain respects like any other business to prevent further illegal collusive behavior.2 9' Clearly, the heads of
the most glamorous and prestigious art auction houses are not beyond
cheapening the extraordinary nature of the goods they sell in order to profit
off a greedy business scheme. To those behind Sotheby's and Christie's
price-fixing scheme, unique pieces of art became widgets to be exploited
for the satisfaction of an auctioneering oligopoly. Taubman, Brooks, and
Davidge effectively cheapened the auction industry's wares. A newspaper
reporter commenting on the recent criminal actions by Sotheby's and
Christie's wrote, "[T]he investigation of the art industry and the subsequent
trials are a reminder that despite their distinguished pedigrees and the huge
sums they spend each year to promote themselves, they are ultimately bro-

kerages.5292 Similarly, the judge who sentenced Taubman commented,
"Price fixing is a crime whether it's committed in the grocery store or the

286 BRIAN W. HARVEY & FRANKLIN MEISEL, AUCTIONS LAW AND PRACTICE 9

(2nd ed.

Oxford University Press 1995) (1985).
287 id.
288 See id.
289 See generally Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 360-61.
290

See id.

291See generally HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 286, at 9.
292 Joshua Chaffin, Court Case Likely to Hasten Changes in Auction Houses, FIN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 6, 2001, at 8 (emphasis added).
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293
halls of a great auction house."
Auction houses should not be considered just "brokerages." As such,
special regulations must be enacted to ensure that the works of art are not
exploited for greed's sake. Clearly, the auction industry is in need of new
regulations so that the trade, and ultimately the appreciation of art, is not
cheapened by the illegal practices of auction houses.294 Indeed, as a result
of the price-fixing scheme, it is thought that New York officials may consider implementing new regulations to replace the old auction regulation295 In addition to price-fixing, the questionable behavior of the auction

houses, including the use of extraordinarily high "guarantees," has made it
clear that the current regulations are feeble at best.296 Ultimately, it may be
the price-fixing scheme that wakes up legislators.2 97 It is, however, a sad
state of affairs when auction houses are looked upon with a distrustful eye
by legislators.2 98 The selling of art warrants respect-the auction house
must not only respect the seller, the buyer, and the public, but also the
uniqueness and extraordinary nature of the goods (art) it sells.
VIII. SPECIAL REGULATION REQUIRED
The art auction industry requires stricter and greater regulation. The
Cristallinadecision and the subsequent regulations enacted in New York
City over a decade ago, as well as the court holdings in Dawson and Pritzker, have been shown to be insufficient to handle the unique nature of the
auction industry.2 99

While the auction houses are in the industry for profit, the goods sold
by auction houses are by far the most unique of any business. 300 It is essential that stricter domestic regulations be enacted-particularly in America
and Britain-to prevent the exploitation of the art that is auctioned.30 '
It would benefit the United States and Britain to follow a similar protocol as the Netherlands and France by having tighter state control over the
auctioneers' actions. Having an objective intermediary present during auction transactions, as in the Netherlands, or, having the auctioneer be responsible to the state, as in France, would necessarily impose stricter and more

293Vogel & Blumenthal, supra note 191, at B8.
294See Chaffin, supra note 292, at 8.
295 Id.
296 See generally id.
297 id.
298 id.

299 See Chaffin, supra note 292, at 8.
300 See Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 360-61.
301See McGill, supra note 5, at C20 (regulations in New York City in the late 1980s were
enacted in response to illegal behavior by the auction houses); see Chaffin, supra note 292,
at 8.
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defined regulations over the auctioneers.302 Because even though auctioneers, particularly under American law, are endowed with a stem fiduciary
responsibility and express warranty liability, auction houses still manage to
ignore their duties, as evidenced in the Cristallinacase, as well as the pricefixing scandal, in order to compete ferociously in the marketplace. For this
reason, not only are stricter domestic regulations required, but so too are
stricter international regulations.30 3
The international community's lack of ability, as well as desire, to enforce international regulations of the auction industry 30 4 must change. With
the international price-fixing scandal, international buyers were bilked out
of millions of dollars. The lack of international (and domestic) regulation

gave room to the top executives of Sotheby's and Christie's to conspire for
six years to the detriment of unassuming customers.
UNESCO does recognize the value and importance of "cultural property", the definition of which includes that which the state deems important
for, inter alia, "art or science" and includes "property of artistic interest,
such as: (i) pictures, paintings... (ii) original works of statutory art and
sculpture... ,,305 Article 1 of UNESCO recognizes the importance and
uniqueness of works of art, and importantly, the delicacy with which they
should be dealt with within a business context. However, the lack of any
direct regulation of the auction industry in UNESCO, in addition to America's, Britain's, and most of the international community's feeble attempt to
even apply UNESCO in practice,30 6 leaves the door wide open for the auction industry to practice illegal business methods. Similarly, the Western
countries outright refusal to sign UNIDROIT in attempts to "protect" their
See O'Keefe & Prott, supra note 11, at 349 (stating that Reeves and Boll suggest that
auctions throughout the international auction industry should be supervised, using the tradition of civil law countries' use of a state-appointed official/intermediary at auctions as examples of such supervision); see also Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 354 (asserting that
America has yet to provide strong consumer protection within the art market and the auction
industry, in comparison to certain European countries, including The Netherlands). Recall,
also, that while the state-appointed official will still be prevalent in the French auction market, the actual requirement of having a state-appointed official at a French auction has been
eliminated.
303 See Introductionsupra note 11, at 349 (discussing the possibility of international
regulation of the auction industry); see generally Reeves & Boll, supra note 2, at 353 (discussing
the difficulty of differing domestic regulations within the larger international auction market).
304 See generally Shinn, supra note 18, at 993 (UNESCO does not appropriately address
the selling of illicit art within private institutions and thus "fails to control the illegal art
trade, especially as it concerns non-state-run... institutions").
305 UNESCO Convention, supra note 241, at art. 1.
306See HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 286, at 205 ("The policy behind...
302

[UNESCO].. remains highly controversial and difficult to implement in practice."); see generally Kunitz, supra note 239, at 529 (stating that UNESCO's language is "vague and indeterminate").
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art markets is a direct slap in the face to international regulation. Britain in
particular wants to keep its auction industry under the radar of international
regulation. It seems the Western countries recognize, shamelessly, that
there is simply too much profit to be made off the selling of stolen art in the
auction industry to sign on to a system of international regulation. 30 7 And,
as mentioned above, while the selling of stolen art is not the only wrongful
activity practiced by auction houses, the lack of enthusiasm with which the
international community attempts to regulate this behavior speaks volumes
about its inability, or desire, to regulate other wrongful practices committed
by the auction industry.
The international community must come together to recognize the
uniqueness of the art traded in the auction industry and faithfully apply to
the auction industry a treaty recognizing as such.
IX. CONCLUSION

This paper has explored international auction house activity and regulation. While the United States (New York) has attempted to emphasize the
fiduciary duty of auctioneers (as evidenced in the Cristallinacase as well as
the City of New York Rules), the civil law countries of the Netherlands and
France tend to have a tighter stronghold on their auctioneers due in large
part to those states' interest and participation in the auction industry. The
relatively ineffective domestic regulation, in conjunction with paltry international regulations, allows for controversial activities by the auction
houses, including keeping secret reserves and giving guarantees. The two
largest auction houses, Christie's and Sotheby's, which have houses in both
Britain and the United States, have taken the controversial behavior to an
extreme by colluding in a six-year price-fixing scheme. Ultimately, it is the
lack of domestic and international regulation that creates an opening for the
auction houses to commit illegal behavior. In addition, the glamour and
prestige of the art world allow auctioneers to continue to attract customers.
The erratic and illegal behavior by the auction houses can be curbed by
stronger and more specialized regulations. A treaty that specifically addresses private institutions including auction houses and that takes into account the unique nature of the goods sold by the auction industry should be
enacted by the international community as well as applied domestically
within each country. This new treaty should emphasize, instead of ignore,
the necessity of controlling and effectively prohibiting illegal business practices by the auction industry. Without international cooperation, the international auction industry could eventually tarnish the reputation of the art
world.

307See generally UnplunderingArt, supra note 267.
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